

BEFORE THE  
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

RATE ADJUSTMENT DUE TO EXTRAORDINARY OR  
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Docket No. R2013-11

**COMMENTS OF THE  
NATIONAL POSTAL POLICY COUNCIL,  
THE MAJOR MAILERS ASSOCIATION, AND  
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRESORT MAILERS  
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACHED  
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE G. BUC**

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November 26, 2013

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(November 26, 2013)**

The National Postal Policy Council (“NPPC”), the Major Mailers Association (“MMA”), and the National Association of Presort Mailers (“NAPM”) respectfully submit these comments in connection with the Statement of Lawrence G. Buc (“Buc Declaration”) filed concurrently as an attachment hereto. Joining NPPC, MMA, and NAPM in support of the Buc Declaration are the American Catalog Mailers Association, the American Forest & Paper Association, the Envelope Manufacturers Association, Grayhair Software, the Greeting Card Association, International Paper, Pitney-Bowes, Inc., the Printing Industries of America, Quad/Graphics, and R. R. Donnelley.

In support of its request for substantially greater-than inflation rate increases pursuant to 39 U.S.C. §3622(d)(1)(E),<sup>1</sup> the Postal Service has submitted a model for estimating the demand for mail. See Further Statement of

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<sup>1</sup> *Renewed Exigent Request of the United States Postal Service In Response To Commission Order No. 1059 at 4 (Sept. 26, 2013).*

Thomas E. Thress and related workpapers. One important finding comes from the demand model and an extremely important assumption feeds into that model. Neither was vetted by any survey or discussion with actual mailers, or any analysis of how and why mailers have made decisions about what and how much to mail:

- One, the model finds that the estimated price elasticities of demand for First-Class Mail and for Standard Regular mail are quite low: -0.157 for First-Class Single Piece Letters, Flats, and Cards; 0.345 for First-Class Presort Letters, Flats, and Cards; and -0.464 for Standard Regular (excluding Parcels).
- Two, the Postal Service assumes that the rate of electronic diversion that was occurring during the years preceding 2007 and 2008 simply continued at the same pace thereafter: “The Postal Service assumes that the trends in its model continued from 2009 through 2012. *Response to POIR No. 2, Q8 (Thress)*. As a result, the Postal Service claims that the increase in electronic diversion that in fact occurred during the years 2007 to 2012 was “due to” the recession and not to other causes.

The Buc Declaration addresses both points. NPPC, MMA, NAPM, and the supporting mailers listed above engaged SLS Consulting, Inc. (“SLS”) to improve the record in this proceeding regarding both the price elasticities of demand of these important postal products – First-Class and Standard Regular mail – and the causes of electronic diversion. SLS was asked to review the Postal Service’s showing regarding the demand elasticities, and to survey and interview mailers to obtain a better understanding of how they respond to price changes and of how electronic diversion factored into their decisions.

## **A. Methodology Of SLS Survey And Interviews**

Part of this effort consisted of analysis by SLS; in addition, SLS also conducted surveys and interviews of a number of mailers to obtain information regarding their use of the mail. The result of that work is reported in the Buc Declaration attached hereto. Additional information regarding how the study was done is provided with the Buc Declaration and in non-public library references NPPC *et al.*-LR-R2013-11/NP1 and NPPC *et al.*-LR-R2013-11/NP2.

As part of their assignment, SLS distributed 38 surveys to mailers who use First-Class Mail for operational and transactional purposes. It also distributed 36 surveys to mailers who market using Standard Mail. Many of the First-Class mailer users also use Standard mail.

Thirteen First-Class Mail surveys were returned; collectively those completing the surveys estimate that they will mail 3.80 billion pieces of First-Class Mail in their current Fiscal Year. Fourteen Standard Mail surveys were returned; collectively those completing surveys estimate that they will mail 5.07 billion pieces of Standard Mail in their current Fiscal Year. Nonpublic library reference NPPC *et al.*-LR-R2013-11/NP1 contains survey form responses for both First-Class Mail and Standard Mail, redacted to protect information of the individual respondents.

SLS also conducted 6 interviews pertaining to First-Class Mail and an additional 6 for Standard Mail. Not all who provided completed surveys participated in interviews and not all who participated in interviews completed

surveys. Nonpublic library reference NPPC *et al*-LR-R2013-11/NP2 contains material relating to the interview discussions, including redacted notes.

Finally, SLS also distributed a supplemental survey pertaining to the recession, diversion and mail volumes. That survey went to 36 mailers of First-Class Mail; 11 responses were received. Respondents in the aggregate have mailed or will mail 4.54 billion pieces of First-Class Mail in their current fiscal year. Data from the supplemental survey is also included in NPPC *et al*.-LR-R2013-11/NP1.

## **B. Conclusions**

The results of the SLS surveys and interviews are summarized in the Buc Declaration submitted concurrently in this proceeding. There were three primary conclusions:

- First, because real postage prices have changed little since 2008, there is little reason to have confidence in projected volume declines caused by a price increase greater than 2.9 percent and as price increases become even greater, estimating volume declines becomes ever more problematic.
- Second, the demand for mail (First-Class and Standard Regular) is likely to be significantly more price elastic than the Postal Service and other recent studies have estimated. In some instances, the price elasticity may exceed an absolute value of one.
- Third, the mailer surveys and interviews found no support for the proposition that the recession in and of itself caused increased electronic diversion. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that increased electronic diversion was independent of the recession, as mailers increasingly sought to use electronic communications for other reasons and as consumers acquired better technology (including mobile) and became more comfortable with using that technology for transactional purposes.

## **II. THE POSTAL SERVICE'S ESTIMATES OF PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ARE TOO LOW**

The Postal Service's demand model presents estimates of the price elasticity of demand. In the case of three major products addressed herein -- First-Class Single-Piece, First-Class Presort (termed "workshare" in the equations), and Standard Regular -- the own-price elasticity estimates provided by the Postal Service are inelastic: -0.157, -0.345, and -0.464, respectively. The Postal Service uses those price elasticities in calculating the volume losses that would result if its requested 4.3 percent exigency rate increase were approved. If the demand for those products is more elastic than the Postal Service assumes, then the requested rate increases would drive away more mail than the Service anticipates in the Statement of Mr. Nickerson.

The Commission should place little faith in those price-elasticity estimates for two reasons: (1) there have been virtually no real price changes in six years, much less any of the magnitude proposed in this case; and (2) an empirical review of how mailers make mailing decisions suggests that the price elasticities are truly much higher.

### **A. The Lack Of Real Price Changes Since 2007 Renders Econometrics Unable To Estimate The Volume Effects Of Large Price Changes**

The Postal Service's price elasticity estimates are the result solely of regression analyses that purport to show the effect of real price changes on volumes. As the Buc Declaration observes, however, since the enactment of the inflation-based price cap regime pursuant to the Postal Accountability and

Enhancements Act, hardly any changes in the real prices have occurred for those products. *Buc Declaration* at Figures 2 & 3.

Econometrics “is of limited use in estimating price-elasticity of demand when prices are enormously stable and the communications market is undergoing a structural transformation.” *Buc Declaration* at 10. With real prices for these products essentially stable since Docket No. R2006-1, econometrics over the years since can provide very little useful information about how mail volumes would respond to price increases that significantly exceed the recent changes in real prices.<sup>2</sup>

For these reasons, the estimated price-elasticities of demand used in the Postal Service models provide no sound basis for estimating volumes if prices change by more than inflation. They certainly provide no reliable basis for forecasting the volume changes that could come from cumulative price increases in the neighborhood of six percent, as the Postal Service is requesting in Dockets Nos. R2013-10 and R2013-11. The proposed price increases are outside of the range in which reliable forecasts can be made.

**B. Mailers Are More Price Elastic Than The Postal Service’s Volume Model Asserts**

The SLS survey and interviews also suggest that “the demand for mail is likely to be more price elastic than estimated in the [Postal Service’s] econometric studies.” Based on its mailer surveys and interviews, SLS concluded that “mailers present a number of reasons why smaller real price

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<sup>2</sup> The average quarter-to-quarter price change since Q3 2006 has been 0.7 percent, and the largest single change in that period was 2.9 percent. *Buc Declaration* at 10.

increases in the future could be met with larger volume drops than predicted by elasticity estimates.” *Buc Declaration* at 19.

In First-Class Mail, participating First-Class Mailers show a continuing decrease in the percentage of their transactional/operational communications that are delivered via First-Class mail. *Id.* at 17, Table 6. Not only are customers more accepting of electronic technologies and more comfortable in communicating with businesses electronically, postage has become such a large percentage of the cost of mailing that postage increases (particularly above-CPI increases) can actually increase the resources available to promote further diversion.

In Standard Mail, several firms that conduct return-on-investment based marketing models tested what their mailing response would be to real price increases of four, ten, and 20 percent. The results indicated that the price elasticity of demand exceeded an absolute value of 1 in each situation tested. *Id.* at 14, Table 2. Slightly lower, but similar results, were reported by other participating mailers, including financial institutions and insurers. *Id.* at 15, Table 3.

Accordingly, the Commission should conclude that the Postal Service’s estimates of price elasticity for First-Class and Standard Regular Mail are too inelastic and should not be relied upon by the Commission.

### **III. THE POSTAL SERVICE'S CENTRAL ASSUMPTION THAT THE RECESSION CAUSED ELECTRONIC DIVERSION TO INCREASE IS CONTRARY TO THE EXPERIENCE OF MAILERS**

The Postal Service claims that it is entitled to exigent rate increases to offset an alleged loss of some 53.6 billion pieces in FY2012 alone “due to” the recession of 2007-2009. *Thress Further Statement at 7, revised in Response to POIR No. 5, Q9.* As part of this contention, it claims that any increase in electronic diversion that occurred during or since the recession – that is, any increase in electronic diversion from the beginning of the recession through September 30, 2012, was “due to” the recession. If the Postal Service is incorrect in its assumption that any increases in electronic diversion over the past six years were due to the recession, then its estimate of lost volume due to the recession is too high.

SLS surveyed and interviewed mailers to determine whether the Postal Service's assumption is realistic. As reported in the Buc Declaration, the assumption appears unsupported by real-world mailer experience. Most importantly, Mr. Buc reports that the:

surveys and interviews provide no support for the proposition that the recession in and of itself caused increased diversion. In fact, they point to just the opposite conclusion: increased diversion was independent of the recession.”

*Buc Declaration at 4.*

Instead, it appears that mailers increased their use of electronic alternatives over recent years for many reasons. Most important were factors such as the adoption of smartphones and tablets by customers, the increased

comfort level consumers have with such devices, and the investments by businesses in improving their own electronic alternatives, such as more feature-rich websites. *Id.* at 24. As one respondent put it: “Adoption of [the] digital age occurred more so after the recession, not due to the recession; rather when the clients became more interested in alternative/readily available information and ability to complete transactions at their fingertips.” *Id.* Contrary to the Postal Service’s assumption, the recession ranked at or near the bottom of the list.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should consider the evidence from mailers presented by the Buc Declaration, and determine that the price elasticities of demand for the Postal Service’s three largest products are considerably more sensitive to price than the Postal Service assumes in its

forecasting model, and that electronic diversion has increased since 2007 for reasons independent of the recession.

Respectfully submitted,

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Statement of Lawrence G. Buc  
SLS Consulting, Inc.

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1 **Statement of Lawrence G. Buc on Behalf of NPPC et al.**

2 My name is Lawrence G. Buc. I am the President of SLS Consulting, Inc. ("SLS"), a Washington, D.C.-  
3 based, consulting firm specializing in postal economics. I have participated in rate and classification  
4 cases of the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service") for over 35 years. I joined the Revenue and  
5 Cost Analysis Division of the Postal Service in March of 1975 and have analyzed postal issues ever since. I  
6 have also been employed by the United States Postal Rate Commission ("Commission") and have been  
7 retained by private clients for consultations on postal topics.

8 This is the tenth case in which I have submitted testimony or comments to the Commission. I have  
9 testified previously in five rate cases (R84-1, R90-1, R97-1, R2000-1, R2006-1), three mail classification  
10 cases (MC76-1, MC77-2, and MC2004-3), and in one complaint case (C99-4). I have testified on behalf of  
11 the Postal Service, a number of interveners, and the Office of the Consumer Advocate at the  
12 Commission.

13 I graduated from Brown University with an A.B. with honors in mathematics and economics. I also  
14 received an M.A. degree in economics from the George Washington University of America. While there,  
15 I was a member of Omicron Delta Epsilon, the national honorary economics society.

16 **Introduction and Summary**

17 I am submitting this statement on behalf of the National Postal Policy Council, the American Catalog  
18 Mailers Association, the American Forest & Paper Association, the Envelope Manufacturers Association,  
19 Grayhair Software, the Greeting Card Association, International Paper, the Major Mailers Association,  
20 the National Association of Presort Mailers, Pitney-Bowes, Inc., the Printing Industries of America,  
21 Quad/Graphics, and R. R. Donnelley. It covers two important topics: (1) the price elasticity of mail, and  
22 (2) the effect of the recession on mail volumes and diversion. This statement is based on an analysis of  
23 studies pertaining to the price elasticity of demand for mail as well as surveys of and discussions with  
24 mailers. Details on the surveys and discussions will follow.

25 **Price Elasticity of Demand**

26 Studies conducted over a number of years in the United States have generally found that the demand  
27 for most classes of mail now classified as Market Dominant is inelastic with respect to price. This means  
28 that mail volume responses to price changes are smaller on a percentage basis than and in the opposite  
29 direction of those price changes; if demand were elastic, the response of mail volume to price changes

1 would be larger than the percentage change in price, but still in the opposite direction. Three recent  
2 studies – one by the Postal Service’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), one by the Postal  
3 Regulatory Commission’s technical staff, and one by the Postal Service itself – all produce these results  
4 for most Market Dominant mail groupings.<sup>1</sup>

5  
6 The elasticity estimates from these studies, however, are based solely on regression analysis, an  
7 econometric tool. With real prices extremely stable in the recent past, econometrics provides very little  
8 useful information about how mail volumes would respond to larger real price increases, particularly  
9 with the rapid changes in alternative channels of communication in this period. In a March 2010 report  
10 for the Postal Service, “Projecting Mail Volumes to 2020”, Boston Consulting Group recognized  
11 important limitations on using econometrics in estimating mail volumes (and implicitly demand  
12 elasticity) and the value of discussions with mailers...

13  
14 Our findings are based on an in-depth study of Sender and Consumer perspectives  
15 about mail and its alternatives for key market segments. This approach has been proven  
16 in work with other posts, and it is particularly applicable in times of economic and  
17 technological upheaval – when traditional long-term econometric approaches, such as  
18 that used by the USPS, break down. BCG at Page 2

19  
20 To provide additional perspective to the elasticity discussion, a group of industry participants undertook  
21 a study of mailers to elicit information from them about how they make mailing decisions with respect  
22 to operational/transactional communications and marketing. The study included (1) surveys of mail  
23 owners focusing on their First-Class Mail and Standard Mail use and (2) a number of in-depth interviews  
24 with mail owners, most, but not all, of whom had responded to the surveys. The mail owners who  
25 participated in the study spanned a wide variety of large mail volume businesses throughout the mailing  
26 industry: banks and credit card issuers, insurance companies, utilities, catalogers, and publishers.

27

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<sup>1</sup> Analysis of Postal Price Elasticities, Report Number: RARC-WP-13-008, Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, May 1, 2013. Are U.S. Postal Price Elasticities Changing? Margaret M. Cigno, Katalin K. Clendinin and Edward S. Pearsall, Presented at the 21<sup>st</sup> Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Center for Research in Regulated Industries, May 29-June 1, 2013. Narrative Explanation of Econometric Demand Equations for Market Dominant Products Filed with Postal Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2013 Prepared for the Postal Regulatory Commission by the United States Postal Service.

1 The survey results and interviews support a view that the demand for mail is likely to be more price  
2 elastic than estimated in the econometric studies. In fact, one group of mailers – catalogers - report  
3 elastic demand derived from running the same return-on-investment/profitability models that they use  
4 in their ordinary course of business to select actual mail recipients from lists of potential recipients.  
5 Other mailers of marketing material who report quantitative results also report higher elasticities than  
6 those estimated in the studies. Finally, mailers of operational/transactional mail provide a compelling  
7 narrative explaining why this mail is likely to be more elastic than estimated using econometrics.

## 8 **The Effect of the Recession on Mail Volume**

9 In Further Statement of Thomas. E. Thress on Behalf of the United States Postal Service in Docket No.  
10 R2010-4R<sup>2</sup>, witness Thress makes truly extraordinary claims about the effect of the recession on mail  
11 volumes. He claims that (1) even in FY 2012, a period that began more than two years after the  
12 recession ended and recovery began, volume losses due to the recession are 53.546 billion pieces, about  
13 one-third of current mail volumes, and (2) the volumes losses due to the recession increased each year  
14 from 2008 to 2012. (Thress, Table 1 at 4) Further, in response to POIR 6 Q14, Thress claims that volume  
15 losses will continue to grow by about 5 billion pieces a year through FY 2013 and 2014. Since these  
16 remarkable estimates of recessionary volume loss hinge on the unsupported assumption that the  
17 recession induced additional electronic substitution, we also asked survey questions about this  
18 assumption, trying to shed light on the relationship between the recession and diversion.

19 There is no doubt that the recession caused reductions in mail volumes for both marketing and  
20 operational/transactional mail during the period the economy was in recession. Further, there is also no  
21 doubt that mail volumes for these two categories of mail are below what they were before the recession  
22 began, largely due to electronic diversion. But the economy has been in recovery since July of 2009.  
23 Further, our surveys and interviews provide no support for the proposition that the recession in and of  
24 itself caused increased diversion. In fact, they point to just the opposite conclusion: increased diversion  
25 was independent of the recession. As one interviewee phrased it, “Whether the recession was there or  
26 not, our company would have been going down the path of electronic anyway.” Another interviewee  
27 expressed a parallel thought, “Adoption of [the] digital age occurred more so after the recession, not  
28 due to the recession; rather when the clients became more interested in alternative/readily available  
29 information and ability to complete transactions at their finger tips.” Finally, a third explained, “We

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<sup>2</sup> Originally filed as part of Docket No. R2010-4R, all statements and library references are now listed as part of Docket No. R2013-11.

1 developed our 'move to electronic communications' plans in 2006 and vetted the plans for approval in  
2 March of 2007. This was before the recession began. That the start of our implementation occurred in  
3 the early part of the recession time period was not planned.”

4 In particular, in response to a question asking respondents who increased their rate of electronic  
5 substitution for operational/transactional mail over the last five years as compared to the previous five  
6 years to rank reasons for this increased electronic substitution, the recession was ranked as the least  
7 important factor.

8 In the rest of this statement, I discuss the price elasticity of demand and the effect of the recession on  
9 mail volume in additional detail.

## 10 **The Demand for Mail is More Elastic than Reported by Regression Analysis**

### 11 **Valid Regression Analysis Must Meet Two Conditions: Those Used to Estimate Price Elasticity** 12 **of Demand Don't**

13 Each year the Postal Service estimates and provides to the PRC demand analyses in accordance with  
14 Commission Rule 3050.26. According to its “Narrative Explanation of Econometric Demand Equations  
15 for Market Dominant Products Filed with Postal Regulatory Commission on January 22, 2013”, the price  
16 elasticity of demand for three important product groups, accounting for well over two thirds of the  
17 Postal Service’s Market Dominant mail volume in that year, varies from fairly inelastic to almost  
18 completely inelastic as shown in Table 1, below. To set a context for the table, the price elasticity of all  
19 goods and service in the economy is, by definition, -1.0. Also, Single-Piece Letters and Cards are  
20 estimated to be even less sensitive to price than is medical care, a highly counter-intuitive proposition  
21 given the emergence of numerous electronic substitutes for mail.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> “Despite a wide variety of empirical methods and data sources, the demand for health care is consistently found to be price inelastic. Although the range of price elasticity estimates is relatively wide, it tends to center on -0.17, meaning that a 1 percent increase in the price of health care will lead to a 0.17 percent reduction in health care expenditures” The Elasticity of Demand for Health Care, A Review of the Literature and its Application to the Military Health System, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Rand Health, RAND.

1 **Table 1. Price Elasticity of Demand for Selected USPS Products (USPS Estimates), FY 2012**

Product Grouping		Elasticity	Base Volume (millions)
		[a]	[b]
First-Class Single Piece Letters, Flats, & Cards	[1]	-0.157	24,359.600
First-Class Workshared Letters, Flats, & Cards	[2]	-0.345	41,993.522
Standard Regular (Excluding Parcels)	[3]	-0.464	41,036.653

Source: Docket No. R2013-11, USPS-R2010-4R/9, AfterRates-Exig-Oct.xlsx

[1][a] "Elasts", cells B11, C11, P11

[2][a] "Elasts", cells E11:N11, Q11:U11

[3][a] "Elasts", cells Z11:AK11

[1][b] "Vols&Revs", SUM(B7:C7, P7)

[2][b] "Vols&Revs", SUM(E7:N7, Q7:U7)

[3][b] "Vols&Revs", SUM(Z7:AK7)

2

3 While estimating slightly different values for these price elasticities, in the reports cited in footnote 1

4 above, the Office of the Inspector General and the staff of the Postal Regulatory Commission have also

5 published studies in the last year showing inelastic demand for most market dominant product

6 groupings. These studies also relied exclusively on regression analysis for their price elasticity of

7 demand results.

8 At the most fundamental level, regression attempts to predict how changes in a dependent variable (in

9 this case mail volume) will be caused by changes in independent variables (in this case, variables like the

10 price of mail and the state of the economy.) To do so, it estimates how past changes in the dependent

11 variable were associated with past changes in the independent variables and then assumes that the

12 same relationship will obtain in the future. From a theoretical perspective, the technique critically

13 depends on the structural relationship between the dependent and the independent variables

14 remaining unchanged in the future from what it was in the past. If the structure changes, there is no

15 basis for assuming that any predictions based on the regression will capture the future relationship

16 correctly. From a practical perspective, the technique critically depends on sufficient variation in the

17 dependent variables to allow predictions across a range of values of those variables. When the values of

18 an independent variable are tightly clustered, there is little predictive power in the relationship of the

19 dependent variable and the independent variables outside of the range of independent variables used in

20 the estimation procedure.

21 The design of a regression analysis to measure the effect of a person's height on his or her weight

22 provides a common sense illustration of both points. On the first point, if input data on height are

23 limited only to adult males of a wide variety of heights, the regression may be useful in predicting the


1 weight of an adult male from his height, but it is far less useful in predicting the weight of a juvenile  
2 female from her height. The structural relationship is simply different: in general, males typically weigh  
3 more than females of the same age and older people typically weigh more than juveniles, at least up to  
4 some age. On the second point, if input data on height are limited only to females from 5'4" to 5'5", the  
5 regression may be useful in predicting the weight of a female who is 5'4½", but it is far less useful in  
6 predicting the weight of a woman who is 4'11" or 6'1" since both heights lie outside the range of the  
7 data on which the regression has been estimated.

8 The regression analyses estimating the price elasticity of demand suffers from both defects: (1) the  
9 structural relationships between mail and factors such as employment, GDP, and others is arguably  
10 changing, and that may make mail more or less price elastic, and (2) while postal prices have been  
11 relatively stable in real terms for a long time, there has been markedly less variation in real prices  
12 recently, particularly since the enactment of PAEA.

13 Figure 1, below, reproduced from an OIG report, shows First-Class Mail volumes and real GDP in the  
14 United States. As the figure shows, while mail volume and GDP used to be tightly correlated, they no  
15 longer are: structural changes in the economy have altered the relationship between mail volume and  
16 GDP over the years. And these structural changes might well have changed the relationship between  
17 mail volume and price. My discussion of the survey and the interviews will show that the structure of  
18 the American economy and its use of First-Class Mail have changed, not due to the recession, but due to  
19 changes in communication technologies and how those changes have changed attitudes.

1

**Figure 1. First-Class Mail Volume and Real GDP**



Source: RARC-WP-12-010, April 27, 2012

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
I now turn to a discussion of price variation in the recent past.

7 **Price Variation**

8 Real prices for three major groupings of postal products (First-Class Single Piece Letters, Flats, and Cards;  
9 First-Class Workshared Letters, Flats, and Cards; and Standard Mail Regular, Excluding Parcels) have  
10 been fairly stable over a long period of time as shown in Figure 2. (The vertical straight black line is  
11 drawn at the date of the first CPI price increase under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act  
12 (PAEA).)

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**Figure 2. Real Price of Mail (1970 – Present)**




Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/1, LR-R2013-11-1-Price Calculations.xlsx, "Charts"

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4 And while prices have been fairly stable over a long period, the CPI price cap regime under PAEA has  
5 further dampened the variability in real prices for these three product groupings as shown in Figure 3,  
6 which simply magnifies the right-hand portion of the previous graph by starting at 2005.

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Figure 3. Real Price of Mail (2005 Present)



Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/1, LR-R2013-11-1-Price Calculations, "Charts"

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4 The data underlying the two graphs also illustrate how stable prices have been. For First-Class Single-  
 5 Piece Mail, the largest single quarter-to-quarter change in the 29 quarters (more than seven years) since  
 6 Q3 2006 is 2.9 percent and the average quarter-to-quarter change is 0.8 percent. For both workshared  
 7 First-Class Mail and Standard Mail, the largest single quarter-to-quarter change in that period is also 2.9  
 8 percent while the average change is 0.7 percent.

9 Thus, there is little reason to have confidence in projected volume declines caused by a price increase  
 10 greater than 2.9 percent and, as price increases become even greater, estimating volume declines  
 11 becomes ever more problematic.

12 **Surveys and Interviews Indicate that Demand for Mail is More Elastic than the Postal Service**  
 13 **Indicates – at Least for First-Class Operational and Transactional Mail and Standard Marketing**  
 14 **Mail**

15 Because econometrics is of limited use in estimating price-elasticity of demand when prices are  
 16 enormously stable and the communications market is undergoing a structural transformation, a group  
 17 of industry participants sponsored a study of mailers to elicit information about how mailers make

1 decisions with respect to operational/transactional communications and marketing mailings. The  
2 results of these studies provide useful insight on price elasticity of demand. The results of these studies  
3 are contained in NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1 and NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP2.

#### 4 ***Study Methods and Design***

5 SLS distributed 38 surveys to mailers who use First-Class Mail for operational and transactional purposes  
6 and 36 surveys to mailers who market using Standard Mail. In many cases, the First-Class mailer users  
7 also used Standard mailers. Thirteen First-Class Mail surveys were returned; collectively those  
8 completing the surveys estimate that they will mail 3.80 billion pieces of First-Class Mail in their current  
9 Fiscal Year. NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary  
10 Statistics". Fourteen Standard Mail surveys were returned; collectively those completing surveys  
11 estimate that they will mail 5.07 billion pieces of Standard Mail in their current Fiscal Year. NPPC et al.-  
12 LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "STD Summary Statistics". The survey forms  
13 for both First-Class Mail and Standard Mail have been redacted to protect information of the individual  
14 respondents. The redacted forms, as well as summary information, are provided in NPPC et al.-LR-  
15 R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx.

16 To follow up on selected topics from the surveys, we also conducted six interviews pertaining to First-  
17 Class Mail and an additional six for Standard Mail. Not all who provided completed surveys participated  
18 in interviews and not all who participated in interviews completed surveys. The lap guide we used for  
19 framing the interview discussions as well as redacted notes from our conversations are provided in  
20 NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11-NP2, LR-R2013-11-NP2 – Interview Notes.docx. Finally, we also distributed a  
21 supplemental survey pertaining to the recession, diversion and substitution, and mail volumes. We  
22 distributed this survey to 36 of the 38 mailers of First-Class Mail who had received the original survey  
23 and received 11 responses. Cumulated across respondents, those who returned surveys mail 4.54  
24 billion pieces of First-Class Mail in their current fiscal year. Data from the supplemental survey is also  
25 included in NPPC et al.-LR-R2011-13/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx.

26 Outside of the Postal Service, no organization has an exhaustive listing of all mailers' mail volumes by  
27 product. Because of this, no party outside of the Postal Service can construct a truly random sample of  
28 mailers or of mail. Ours wasn't. But we did send surveys to all firms for which our sponsors provided  
29 contact information, and we have no reason to believe that these potential respondents were biased in  
30 any fashion other than being mailers of large volumes of mail. Similarly, we have no reason to believe

1 that our responses were subject to any response bias. Our responses cover a large volume of mail and  
2 span a wide range of businesses: banks and credit card issuers, insurance companies, utilities,  
3 catalogers, and publishers. Finally, we believe we achieved a satisfactory response rate given the time  
4 required to fill out the survey, the busy schedules of those who completed it, the period for response,  
5 and the period of time for participating in interviews. Thus, we believe our responses to be  
6 representative of mailers in general for workshared transactional/operational and marketing mail.

## 7 ***Standard Mail Results***


8 In its description of factors affecting demand elasticity, Christensen notes...

9           The larger the share of the household budget allocated to purchase of a good, the more  
10           sensitive the consumer is to price. This is because it is worth the effort for the consumer to  
11           search out substitution alternatives for these big purchases while it might not be so for  
12           purchases that are a very small share of the budget. Analysis of Postal Price Elasticities,  
13           Report Number: RARC-WP-13-008, Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service,  
14           May 1, 2013, page 46.

15 Data from a supplier to the mailing industry show that for one category of Standard Mail, catalogs,  
16 postage comprises a large and growing share of its cost of marketing through the mail.

17

1 **Figure 4. Postage Trends Have Far Exceeded Inflation & Other Catalog Cost Components**



2

3 This fact alone motivates the thought that demand for Standard Mail might be more elastic than

4 estimated econometrically.

5 Survey results and interviews both support the position that the demand for Standard Mail is more

6 elastic than estimated econometrically. A series of questions asked marketers with formal models that

7 they use in their business for selecting mail recipients from lists of potential recipients to run these

8 models at real price increases of four, ten, and 20 percent and report volume declines.<sup>4</sup> I constructed

9 from survey responses and discussion with marketers the following paragraph summarizing their

10 general approach to determining how much volume to mail...

11 "As business people, we try to maximize our profitability. Determining whom to mail to

12 determines how much to mail, and is critical to our business. Over the years, we have

13 developed and improved our capabilities and those who don't use similar analytics don't

<sup>4</sup> The exact questions were: Does the company use formal models to determine the allocation of marketing budget to different types of marketing and/or to different channels? If so, when do you run the models and how are they used? What are the input variables to the model and what are the outputs? If the price of mail is an explicit input to the models, please run them with an increased price of mail of 4 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent above inflation (across all mail classes) and tell us what happens to the amount of marketing volume of mail and the other marketing channels. NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, beginning in row 76 of all worksheets that begin with "Standard Survey".

1 survive. While input values (response rates, lifetime value of a customer, required ROI,  
2 etc) and output answers of others may differ from ours, at a high level, their methods  
3 are the same. Based on our analytics, we mail to everyone up to the point where we  
4 first exceed and then hit our ROI targets. We do this by estimating response rates and  
5 average value of sale (for our house list) and segment customers into groups varying  
6 across these parameters. We mail to all that are profitable (although in some cases for  
7 marketing credit cards they must also have passed prescreening requirements with  
8 respect to credit scores.) Postage represents the majority of our mailing expense and  
9 postage increases increase mailing cost. When that happens, those people whom we  
10 estimate to have a lower response rate or a lower expected value of sale no longer  
11 receive mail (although they may be marketed in other channels), since it is no longer  
12 profitable to mail to them."

13 Per our instructions in the survey, these firms ran their marketing models at real price increases of four,  
14 ten, and 20 percent and reported the volume decreases associated with these price increases. Four  
15 firms in the cataloging or publishing industry collectively representing about 755 million pieces of mail in  
16 their current fiscal year provided answers to these questions.

17 **Table 2. Price Elasticity of Demand Calculated from Mailing Models: Catalogers and Publishers**

<b>Real Price Increase (Percent)</b>	<b>Modeled Volume Decrease (Percent)</b>	<b>Implied Elasticity</b>
4%	7.0%	- 1.75
10%	14.8%	- 1.48
20%	23.4%	- 1.17

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx,  
"STD Summary Statistics"

18  
19 As Table 2 shows, the marketing models show that rather than being inelastic, the demand is actually  
20 elastic. Volume responses are slightly bigger than the price increase.

21 An additional five companies collectively representing about 2.9 billion pieces of mail in their current  
22 fiscal year also provided elasticity estimates based on their experience with and understanding of their  
23 marketing models rather than actually running the models themselves. Four of these five firms  
24 comprising 2.6 billion pieces of mail are financial institutions or insurers. Their reported results in Table  
25 3 generally show demand to be elastic, although somewhat less so than the catalogers and publishers.

1

**Table 3. Reported Price Elasticity of Demand: Other Standard Mailers**

<b>Real Price Increase (Percent)</b>	<b>Modeled Volume Decrease (Percent)</b>	<b>Implied Elasticity</b>
4%	3.6%	- 0.91
10%	10.5%	- 1.05
20%	21.5%	- 1.08

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx,  
"STD Summary Statistics"

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3 Finally, we aggregated results from both groups of mailers using volume weighting, with results as  
4 shown in Table 4 below. According to these results, Standard Mail also appears more elastic than  
5 reported in the Postal Service’s regression studies.

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**Table 4. Reported Price Elasticity of Demand: All Standard Mailers**

<b>Real Price Increase (Percent)</b>	<b>Modeled Volume Decrease (Percent)</b>	<b>Implied Elasticity</b>
4%	4.5%	- 1.12
10%	11.7%	- 1.17
20%	22.5%	- 1.13

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "STD Summary Statistics"

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3 ***First-Class Mail Results***

4 For Standard Mail, the decision as to how much to mail rests solely with the entity sending the mail; for  
5 First-Class operational and transactional mail (bill and statements, privacy notices, etc.) customers may  
6 have a legal choice about whether they choose to receive a particular communication by mail or through  
7 an electronic channel. Even in circumstances for which customers don't have a legal right, a company  
8 may honor a customer's communication preference because of the risk of losing a customer.

9 Consequently, most companies do not have formal models showing how their First-Class  
10 operational/transactional mail volume will respond to price changes. Thus, rather than asking for  
11 results from non-existent models, we constructed a set of survey questions the answers to which might  
12 shed light on the price elasticity issue. We augmented this with discussions with mailers on the topic.

13 Data from respondents show that while mail is still the predominant communication channel, electronic  
14 communication continues to make steady inroads.

15

**Table 5. Channel Choice for Transactional Operational Mail**

<b>Channel</b>	<b>Numbers of Transactional/Operational Communications by Channel (Mail Pieces)</b>		
	<b>Projected Total Current Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Last Year</b>	<b>Year Before Last</b>
Mail	3,035,161,290	3,003,734,595	3,072,205,659
Electronic	893,804,106	778,438,654	657,624,765
Other	-	66,025	315,389
Total	3,928,965,396	3,782,239,274	3,730,145,813
Mail as Percent of Total	77.3%	79.4%	82.4%

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary Statistics"

16

17 The change in communication channel choice over the last five years illustrates the continuing and  
18 relentless electronic diversion.

1

**Table 6. Channel Choice**

<b>Percentage Transactional/Operational Communications that Could be Sent by FCM that Actually Are</b>		
<b>Projected Total – Current Fiscal Year of Mailer</b>	<b>Three Years Ago</b>	<b>Five Years Ago</b>
69%	79%	88%

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary Statistics"

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Mailers say that they prefer electronic channels because mail is expensive compared to the electronic substitutes. Not only is mail expensive, but increasingly, mailers focus on the cost of postage. During the course of the discussions with mailers, I was told that in “the old days” the cost rule of thumb for mail was a third, a third, a third: postage was a third the cost of a mailing, paper and other supplies were another third, and labor was the final third.

8

Today and for the last few years, according to survey respondents, postage has increased and now comprises a much greater share of the cost of mailing.

9

10

**Table 7. Cost of Mailing**

	<b>First-Class Mail Expense Percentages</b>		
	<b>Current Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Last Year</b>	<b>Year Before Last</b>
Postage	75.5%	74.6%	74.3%
All Others (Ink/Toner/Paper/Labor etc)	23.9%	24.6%	25.1%

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary Statistics"

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12

As postage has become more expensive, it and the mailings it pays for are increasingly topics of concern within corporations. Mailers say that if they could “snap their fingers and convert all their customers to electronic communications”, they would certainly do so. In large part, because many mailers already have the infrastructure in place to accommodate the conversion, the technical marginal cost of an electronic communication is very low, certainly much less than postage and other costs of physical mail.

15

17

But mailers remain wary of a high potential cost of forced conversions: mailers know they need to respect their customer’s preferences or risk losing some customers. At current mail prices, they simply won’t risk losing valuable customers over the issue of communication channels. While it may be expensive to send monthly statements to a customer, it would be far more expensive to lose a

18

19

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1 profitable customer to a competitor who respected the customer’s communication preferences. I heard  
2 that story over and over again: “We take customers where they are”, and “We communicate with our  
3 customers in their preferred manner.”

4 Because of this, mailers have so far used “carrots” rather than “sticks” to try to convert customers to  
5 electronic channels. Carrots include on-line access to historic statements, environmental nudges like  
6 pointing out alleged virtues of electronic communications as compared to paper or offering to plant  
7 trees in return for conversions, entry in a lottery for valuable prizes, a reduction in the amount of a loan,  
8 no-fee checking, etc, etc. Also, mailers are exploring the use of larger and sweeter carrots.

9 Further, some customers prefer electronic communication to the mail; these customers do not require  
10 carrots to convert and many of them are more than willing to sign up for accounts that don’t use the  
11 mail for communication. For example, my children just laugh when I ask them whether they get  
12 statements or bills by mail. Finally, as time goes by, and those of us who are not digital natives become  
13 more comfortable in the digital world, electronic communication simply becomes more natural and a  
14 large segment of the population becomes more amenable to persuasion.

15 But despite the consumer-friendly approach to date, most mailers understand that sticks may also work  
16 in some instances where carrots haven’t. Some have experimented with mail surcharges (although  
17 usually not for extremely valuable customers) and most mailers have talked about the need to increase  
18 the use of sticks if postage increases become larger in real terms or less predictable, both of which are  
19 outcomes of “busting the cap”. For example, some low-balance savings or checking accounts may  
20 require their owners to accept electronic communication. And of course, as more mailers use  
21 surcharges and the like, the probability of losing a customer over the practice decreases. At this point,  
22 there will be far less restraint on the part of the mailers. Drawing an analogy to another industry, it will  
23 be much harder for customers to punish those airlines with baggage fees when all airlines have baggage  
24 fees.

25 Finally, in some industries laws and regulations which previously required physical communication no  
26 longer do. Thus, in some states, insurance companies may now send insurance binders or proof of  
27 insurance by e-mail, rather than mail and this fact expands the universe of potential substitution.<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>5</sup> In fact, 11 states now allow online presentment of policy contracts, 26 allow mobile presentment of insurance cards, and four allow e-mail of cancelation/non-renewal notices.

1 universe of potential substitution could also be expanded by regulatory interpretations. As one bank  
2 said...

3 For credit cards, Regulation Z (or the Truth in Lending Act) is the major requirement that  
4 provisions how "cost of credit" disclosures must be delivered. Reg. Z and many of the other  
5 requirements do not specifically call out "in writing", or if they do use phrasing like "in writing or  
6 similar means", or "clear and conspicuous", which can be interpretive.

7 And the bank told me that while they already believed it perfectly legal to deliver these notices in  
8 channels other than mail, increased prices for mail would lead them to be far more likely to act on this  
9 belief.

10 Several representatives of financial institutions said that the proposed exigent price increase had  
11 attracted attention either at the C-suite level or at the level directly below it. They said that this  
12 attention is virtually unprecedented. More mailers also said that when price increases are higher than  
13 inflation, the value of the differential above supports conversion to electronics. In other words, the  
14 Postal Service basically provides the money they need to invest to fund the campaigns they will use to  
15 persuade their customers to convert. So, as postage prices rise higher and higher, these companies in  
16 essence have more money to invest. As part of the discussion, some mailers also explained that these  
17 investments will "move higher in the ranking of potential investments" if the exigent increase is  
18 approved.

19 In summary, mailers present a number of reasons why smaller real price increases in the future could be  
20 met with larger volume drops than predicted by elasticity estimates: (1) postage matters, (2)  
21 technologies are in place to accommodate electronic substitution, (3) customers are more accepting of  
22 communication channels other than mail, (4) carrots can be sweeter and sticks could be used, (5) senior  
23 management is watching and worried that current price increases are harbingers of even larger ones in  
24 the future.

## 25 **The Recession In and Of Itself Did Not Accelerate Electronic Diversion**

26 Thomas E. Thress presents the Postal Service's estimates of volume losses due to the recession. He  
27 makes truly extraordinary claims about the overall mail volume losses due to the recession and how  
28 long following the recession these recessionary mail volume losses have lasted:

1 Even more significant to the Postal Service, the Postal Service’s financial losses due to  
2 factors related to and triggered by the Great Recession continue to accrue even now,  
3 four years after the general U.S. economy has been in recovery. Thress at 6

4 The estimated cumulative effect of factors relating to the Great Recession on total  
5 Market-Dominant mail from FY 2008 through FY 2012, as shown in the final row of Table  
6 Two, is a loss of Market-Dominant mail volume of 53.5 billion pieces of mail.

7  
8 That is to say, it is my estimate that, if macro-economic conditions had not deteriorated  
9 between FY 2007 and FY 2012, and the relationship between mail volume and macro-  
10 economic and other factors had remained the same as before the Great Recession, total  
11 Market-Dominant mail volume would have been 53.5 billion pieces higher in FY 2012  
12 than actual volumes that year, or 209.8 billion pieces of total mail, as compared to  
13 actual FY 2007 volume for these categories of mail of 209.4 billion pieces. Thress at 7.

14 Thus, in summary, he claims that even in FY 2012, a period that began more than two years after the  
15 recession ended and recovery started, volume losses due to the recession amounted to 53.546 billion  
16 pieces, about one-third of current mail volume. He also claims that the volume losses due to the  
17 recession increased each year from 2008 to 2012. (Thress, Table 1 at 4) Finally, he claims that these  
18 volume losses will continue to grow even larger in FY 2013 (58.790 billion) and 2014 (63.895 billion).  
19 POIR.6.Q.14.ExigentImpact.xlsx, “Testimony Tables”.

20  
21 Importantly, Mr. Thress has candidly admitted that much of his claim about the recessionary volume  
22 losses is based on his judgment and interpretation of the econometrics rather than the econometrics  
23 themselves. As Mr. Thress stated...

24  
25 Careful econometric analysis can be extremely useful in identifying when these net diversion  
26 trends might have changed and to quantify these trends historically. But to understand why  
27 these trends have changed, as well as predict the impact in wider ranges of prices, requires  
28 moving outside of the econometric models and analyzing the underlying factors that are driving  
29 these trends. POIR.3.Q.1

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31 And again...

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It is not possible to isolate the separate effects of coincident trends on mail volume econometrically. The econometric demand equations presented in this case are only capable of measuring net mail diversion over a particular time period. In order to identify the specific factors underlying net mail diversion, it is necessary to step outside of the econometric model and seek outside information on what these factors might be and their relative importance. POIR.6.Q.25

Continuing to peel the onion, Thress’s judgment on Postal Service’s recessionary volume loss hinge on the unsupported assumption that the recession caused behavioral changes...

It is also obvious that the Great Recession has had a significant impact on the behavior of consumers, businesses, and governments within the United States (and around the world). These behavioral changes include changes to the relationship between Americans and the mail in ways that are clearly consistent with other behavioral changes observed over this same time period and **appear** to be in direct response to the Great Recession. POIR 6.Q.4 (emphasis added)

Lacking any theoretical construct as to why and how these changes might have been caused by the recession or data to show that they were, Thress simply posited that they were...

After a careful analysis of the relevant factors and the affected mail volumes, which included careful consideration of additional information beyond my econometric models, for those factors which I have attributed to the Great Recession, I could not find sufficient evidence to support the possibility that these factors were caused by something other than the Great Recession. POIR 6.Q.4

In contrast to Thress, rather than simply assuming there was or wasn’t a relationship between the recession and business behavior with respect to mail, we explored this critical issue by distributing a supplemental survey (NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, all worksheets that begin with "Follow-Up") that included three questions on the relationship and allowed for a comment:

1

1. Over the last five years did you increase your rate of electronic substitution for your company's operational/transactional mail as compared to the previous five years?

Yes  
 No

2. If so, please rank the following factors in order of importance (1 being the most important factor, 9 being the least important) to which you attribute this acceleration of electronic substitution.

Introduction/adoption of new technologies by customers (e.g., smartphone, tablet)  
 Development of electronic alternatives by your company (e.g., apps, websites)  
 Company campaigns to encourage adoption of electronic alternatives  
 Changes in regulatory requirements  
 The 2007-2009 recession  
 Increased company focus on controlling costs  
 Increased comfort level of customers with electronic alternatives  
 The growing number of "digital natives" in your customer base  
 Other (specify)

3. Was your company's annual budget available to invest in developing electronic alternatives; and encouraging customers to adopt electronic alternatives during the recession higher than, lower than, or the same as it was in the years after the recession?

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx.

2

3 We also asked for current year's estimated total First-Class Mail volume (if they had not already  
4 submitted a First-Class Mail Survey response) so we could weight responses and provided a response  
5 block for any comments a respondent choose to provide.

6 We received responses from 11 mailers indicating they have increased their rate of electronic diversion  
7 in the last five years as compared to the previous five years. Volume losses from mailers like these are  
8 exactly the losses that Mr. Thress has judged as being "due to" the recession. In their current fiscal year,  
9 survey respondents will collectively mail 4.5 billion pieces of First-Class Mail, a not insignificant share of  
10 the total volume of First-Class Mail.

11 In response to the question asking them to rank the reasons for their electronic substitution, only two of  
12 the mailers used the "other" category, one of whom ranked "the environment" as the fourth most  
13 important factor and the other of whom ranked "CASS Cycle L" as the sixth most important factor.  
14 Because each of these factors appeared only once, we dropped them from further analysis and rescored  
15 the factors ranking below them for these two respondents, promoting each lower-ranked factor one  
16 place. Thus, for analytic purposes, we use eight factors. Further, one respondent ranked only five  
17 factors. For the three that were unranked, we assigned them all a ranking of 7, the average of the  
18 missing rankings. Finally, one respondent categorized six factors as "high" and two as "low." Since the  
19 "high" responses were all similarly ranked, we assigned an average score of 3.5 for these, and an

1 average score of 7.5 for those categorized as “low.” Our conclusions are robust to these editing  
2 procedures: they only simplify calculations without affecting our results. The raw data (with company  
3 names redacted) appear in NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM  
4 RAW DATA".

5 As the data show, of the 11 respondents, only one ranked the recession as being anything other than  
6 the least or second least important factor for their increased electronic substitution over the last five  
7 years; even this single mailer ranked the recession only as the fourth most important factor. Five of the  
8 mailers ranked the recession as the single least important factor, one ranked it as tied for least most  
9 important, and the remaining four ranked it as the seventh (of a possible eight) least important factor.  
10 It is thus correct to say that these mailers feel that very little of their increased diversion is due to the  
11 recession.

12 Table 8 summarizes the raw data on the importance of various factors for increased electronic  
13 substitution we received from this phase of the survey, edited as described above. The columns display  
14 four alternative methods for rankings the importance of the factors accounting for increased electronic  
15 substitutions over the last five years. The first simply calculates the average ranking while the second  
16 calculates the average ranking weighted by the mail volume of the respondents. As these two columns  
17 show, our respondents state that the 2007-2009 recession and changes in regulatory requirements are  
18 the least important factors by a wide margin in their increased electronic substitution. Far more  
19 important are factors that relate to technology availability (Introduction/adoption of new technologies  
20 by customers, Development of electronic alternatives by companies), the acceptability to customers of  
21 new technology (Increased comfort level of customers with electronic alternatives, The growing number  
22 of “digital natives”), and company understanding that e-communication is a less expensive alternative  
23 than paper (Increased company focus on controlling costs, Company campaigns to encourage adoption  
24 of electronic alternatives.)

25 The third and fourth columns simply re-rank the average scores in the first two columns respectively  
26 from 1 to 8 based on the ordering in those first two columns. These re-rankings also show that the  
27 2007-2009 recession and changes in regulatory requirements are again the least important factors by a  
28 wide margin in their increased electronic substitution.

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**Table 8. Reasons for Increased Electronic Substitution**

	Raw Score		Ranking	
	Average	Weighted Avg	Average	Weighted Avg
Introduction/adoption of new technologies by customers (e.g., smartphone, tablet)	2.68	3.03	1	2
Increased comfort level of customers with electronic alternatives	2.77	2.66	2	1
Development of electronic alternatives by your company (e.g., apps, websites)	3.41	3.93	3	4
Increased company focus on controlling costs	3.68	3.51	4	3
Company campaigns to encourage adoption of electronic alternatives	4.41	3.98	5	5
The growing number of “digital natives” in your customer base	5.05	4.51	6	6
Changes in regulatory requirements	7.00	7.43	7	8
The 2007-2009 recession	7.09	7.16	8	7

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary Statistics"

2

3 Comments from the mailers support their rankings. As one interviewee phrased it, “Whether the  
4 recession was there or not, our company would have been going down the path of electronic anyway.”

5 A second expressed much the same thought, “We developed our ‘move to electronic communications’  
6 plans in 2006 and vetted the plans for approval in March of 2007. This was before the recession began.

7 That the start of our implementation occurred in the early part of the recession time period was not  
8 planned.” Finally, a third also noted that his company’s increased substitution was not due to the

9 recession, “Adoption of [the] digital age occurred more so after the recession, not due to the recession  
10 rather than when the clients became more interested in alternative/readily available information and

11 ability to complete transactions at their finger tips.”

12 New technologies are not free; under most theories of technological dispersion, investment is necessary  
13 to promote this dispersion. But during the recession, as shown by Thress, investment in the United

14 States was sharply reduced.<sup>6</sup> Thus, we hypothesized that it would be unusual for the typical company to  
15 actually invest more in promoting diversion while overall investment was sharply curtailed. Table 9

16 below shows mailers expenditures on developing technology for electronic alternatives and encouraging  
17 their customers to divert.

18

<sup>6</sup> Docket No. R2013-11, USPS-R2010-4R/10, Sources-of-ChangeCalcs.xlsx, “Input Data”, column H.

1

**Table 9. The Recession and Electronic Substitution Budget**

<b>During the Recession, Budget Was...</b>	<b># of Mailers</b>	<b>% of Volume</b>
Bigger	3	30.6%
Smaller	2	22.4%
Same	6	47.0%

Source: NPPC et al.-LR-R2013-11/NP1, LR-R2013-11-NP1 – Survey Results.xlsx, "FCM Summary Statistics"

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3 The rows show the effect of the recession on the budgets companies allocated to investing in electronic  
4 alternatives. Our results confirm our hypothesis. Only three of the 11 mailers (representing about 31  
5 percent of the reported mail) increased their budgets to promote diversion during the recession: the  
6 remaining eight did not. Of these, six of them (representing about 47 percent of the mail) reported the  
7 same investments while the other two (representing 22 percent of the mail) invested less as compared  
8 to the period following the recession.

9 Given that their investment budgets are compatible with their rankings and their statements on the  
10 effect of the recession on electronic substitution, we found no support for the proposition that  
11 increased electronic diversion of First-Class operations and transactional mail was due to the recession.  
12 In fact our surveys and interviews support the proposition that the increased substitution was in fact  
13 independent of the recession regardless of the Postal Service’s judgment on the issue.

## 14 **Summary**

15 This statement discusses two important topics: (1) the price elasticity of demand for mail and (2)  
16 whether the recession induced additional electronic diversion. With respect to the price elasticity of  
17 demand, I show that recent real prices have been remarkably stable and that reliable predictions from  
18 regression depend on variation in the independent variables; together, these two facts render the  
19 econometrically derived elasticities unreliable. In contrast, I then provide information from mailers  
20 derived through survey and discussion showing that demand for mail is far more elastic than estimated  
21 by regression analysis: for Standard Mail demand is elastic and for First-Class Mail, mailers present a  
22 number of reasons why smaller real price increases in the future could be met with larger volumes drops  
23 than predicted by elasticity estimates

1 With respect to whether the recession induced additional electronic diversion, I provide information  
2 from mailers showing that this is not the case. Mailers rank the recession as least important among  
3 eight possible factors in accelerating electronic diversion and their comments and budgets strongly  
4 support their rankings. As one mailer explained, “Whether the recession was there or not, our company  
5 would have been going down the path of electronic anyway.” In light of this information and his  
6 repeated candid admissions that the econometric model does not and cannot know what caused the  
7 increased electronic substitution, the Postal Regulatory Commission should not accept witness Thress’s  
8 judgment that the recession caused additional electronic substitution.

9

DECLARATION

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing was prepared by me or under my supervision and is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: November 26, 2013



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Lawrence G. Buc